Propositional structure and truth conditions

Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225 (2012)
Abstract
This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames
Keywords Propositional Structure  Truth Conditions
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References found in this work BETA
Jeffrey C. King (2009). Questions of Unity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):257 - 277.
Nathan Salmon (1989). Tense and Singular Propositions. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. 331--392.

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