Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):303-17 (2000)
|Abstract||Naturalism about the mind is often taken to be equivalent to some form of physicalism: the existence of mental properties must be shown not to compromise the autonomy of the physical realm. It is argued that this leads to a choice between reductionism, eliminativism, epiphenomenalism or interactionism. The central aim of the paper is to outline an Aristotelian alternative to the physicalist conception of natural bodies. It is argued that the distinction between form and matter, and an ontology which treats individual natural bodies as real, unified things, rather than as complexes, enables us to achieve the non-reductionist, non-epiphenomenalist and non-interactionist position which eludes the post-Cartesian|
|Keywords||Body Cartesianism Metaphysics Mind Naturalism Thing|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.) (1994). The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
Charles Taliaferro (1997). Possibilities in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):127-37.
Lilli Alanen (2008). Descartes' Mind-Body Composites, Psychology and Naturalism. Inquiry 51 (5):464 – 484.
William Jaworski (2005). Hylomorphism and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:201-216.
Jaegwon Kim (2004). The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn. In The Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
Han-Kyul Kim (2008). Locke and the Mind-Body Problem: An Interpretation of His Agnosticism. Philosophy 83 (4):439-458.
Paul Hoffman (1986). The Unity of Descartes's Man. Philosophical Review 95 (3):339-370.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads38 ( #31,488 of 556,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?