Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism

Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137 (2011)
In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
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DOI jphil201110837
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Paulina Sliwa (2012). In Defense of Moral Testimony. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
Paulina Sliwa (2015). Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.

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