Truth by default

Philosophia Mathematica 9 (1):5-20 (2001)
There is no preferred reduction of number theory to set theory. Nonetheless, we confidently accept axioms obtained by substituting formulas from the language of set theory into the induction axiom schema. This is only possible, it is argued, because our acceptance of the induction axioms depends solely on the meanings of aritlunetical and logical terms, which is only possible if our 'intended models' of number theory are standard. Similarly, our acceptance of the second-order natural deduction rules depends solely on the meanings of the logical terms, which implies, it is argued, that our second-order quantifiers have to be standard.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/9.1.5
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V. Mc Gee (2005). Two Conceptions of Truth? – Comment. Philosophical Studies 124 (1):71 - 104.

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