|Abstract||There are two natural objections to epistemicist accounts of vagueness that one frequently encounters in conversation (objections that are frequently run together).2 One objection is that it is hard to live without an informative answer to the question as to how the nonsemantic facts – non-relational and relational -- about a given individual determine the semantic profile of that individual. Let us call this the Bruteness worry. A second objection is that it seems metaphysically arbitrary that just one of the many candidate cutoffs for, say, baldness, should be associated with some ordinary pattern of use of the term ‘bald’. Let us call this the Arbitrariness worry. In this paper we sketch an epistemicist approach to vagueness that provides a distinctive perspective on these foundational issues. On the one hand, it affords epistemicism protection against the Arbitrariness worry, by combining the even-handedness typically associated with supervaluationism with the logic and semantics distinctive of epistemicism.3 And on the other, it renders the Bruteness objection less pressing by assimilating it to a kind of bruteness that many of us have already learned to live with. Our view relies on a plenitudinous metaphysics to which we are antecedently sympathetic. Like any metaphysically laden view, it is inevitably somewhat tendentious. But its unity and elegance make it at least deserving of a place on the philosophical map|
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