The puzzle of pure moral deference1

Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344 (2009)
Case B. You tell me that eating meat is immoral. Although I believe that, left to my own devices, I would not think this, no matter how long I reflected, I adopt your attitude as my own. It is not that I believe that you are better informed about potentially relevant non-moral facts (e.g., about the conditions under which livestock is kept, or about the typical effects of eliminating meat from one’s diet). On the contrary, I know that I have all of the non-moral information relevant to the issue that you have.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00174.x
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Paulina Sliwa (2012). In Defense of Moral Testimony. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
Paulina Sliwa (2015). Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).

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