David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):495-509 (2010)
Abstract: Interpretations of the Tractatus divide into what might be called a metaphysical and an anti-metaphysical approach to the work. The central issue between the two interpretative approaches has generally been characterised in terms of the question whether the Tractatus is committed to the idea of ‘things’ that cannot be said in language, and thus to the idea of a distinctive kind of nonsense: nonsense that is an attempt to say what can only be shown. In this paper, I look at this dispute from a different perspective, by focusing on the treatment of the concept of internal relations. By reference to the work of Peter Hacker, Hidé Ishiguro and Cora Diamond, I show how this concept is understood quite differently in each of the two interpretative traditions. I focus particularly on how Wittgenstein's idea of the ‘internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world’ (Tractatus 4.014) might be understood within the two interpretative approaches. I offer some reasons in support of the anti-metaphysical treatment of the concept
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References found in this work BETA
Warren Goldfarb (1997). Metaphysics and Nonsense. Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (1):57-73.
P. M. S. Hacker (2001). Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies. Oxford University Press.
Hidé Ishiguro (1981). Wittgenstein and the Theory of Types. In Irving Block (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Basil Blackwell. 43-60.
David Pears (2006). Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Thomas Ricketts (1996). Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. In Hans D. Sluga & David G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein. Cambridge University Press. 59--99.
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