David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):666–688 (2003)
The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions
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Citations of this work BETA
Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
Andrew Thomas (2011). Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality. Erkenntnis 75 (1):113-122.
Gerald Vision (2005). Deflationary Truthmaking. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (3):364–380.
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