We Turing machines aren't expected-utility maximizers (even ideally)
Philosophical Studies 64 (1):115 - 123 (1991)
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Jack Copeland (1998). Turing's o-Machines, Searle, Penrose, and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128-138.
Joel David Hamkins & Andy Lewis (2000). Infinite Time Turing Machines. Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2):567-604.
Hans Lottenbach (1994). Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.
Leon Horsten (1995). The Church-Turing Thesis and Effective Mundane Procedures. Minds and Machines 5 (1):1-8.
Stephen A. Clark (2000). Revealed Preference and Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Peter Kugel (2002). Computing Machines Can't Be Intelligent (...And Turing Said So). Minds and Machines 12 (4):563-579.
Joel David Hamkins (2002). Infinite Time Turing Machines. Minds and Machines 12 (4):567-604.
B. Jack Copeland (2002). Accelerating Turing Machines. Minds and Machines 12 (2):281-300.
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