Belief and aims

Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439 (2012)
Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims that exclusivity is in fact compatible with belief’s genuinely having an aim. I argue, based on consideration of what is involved in pursuing an aim, that Steglich-Petersen’s reply fails. I suggest that the defender of the idea that belief has an aim should instead reject the claim of exclusivity, and I sketch how this can be done.
Keywords Belief  Aim of belief  Doxastic deliberation  Epistemic normativity
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9728-z
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
Charles Côté-Bouchard (2015). Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.

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Similar books and articles
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
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Masahiro Yamada (2012). Taking Aim at the Truth. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
Ralph Wedgwood (2013). The Right Thing to Believe. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press 123-139.

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