Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94 (2012)
We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our doxastic states are in fact voluntary (This strategy has been pursued by Steup 2008 ; Weatherson 2008 ). In this paper I argue that this strategy is neither successful nor necessary. Our doxastic states are not voluntary in any interesting sense. But once we see why our doxastic states are not voluntary, we can also see that there is no apparent reason to think that deontic prescriptions and appraisals—epistemic ones, at any rate—presuppose doxastic voluntarism. Indeed, there is good reason to deny that they do so. Finally, I diagnose the misleading attraction of the idea that what I call ‘epistemic deontology’ presupposes doxastic voluntarism.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-011-9299-6
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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Citations of this work BETA
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):n/a-n/a.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.

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