Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
|Abstract||Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Keith Hossack (2003). Consciousness in Act and Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.
Quentin Smith (1981). Four Teleological Orders of Human Action. Philosophical Topics 12 (3):213-230.
John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
Paul Hoffman (2005). Aquinas on Threats and Temptations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2):225–242.
John Ladd (1952). Free Will and Voluntary Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (March):392-405.
Conor Mchugh (forthcoming). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) (2003). Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press.
Berent Enç (2003). How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. Oxford University Press.
Robert D. Heslep (1985). Gewirth and the Voluntary Agent's Esteem of Purpose. Philosophy Research Archives 11:379-391.
Josefa Toribio (2011). What We Do When We Judge. Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.
Added to index2009-11-23
Total downloads57 ( #17,361 of 549,628 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,628 )
How can I increase my downloads?