Judging as a non-voluntary action

Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269 (2011)
Many philosophers categorise judgment as a type of action. On the face of it, this claim is at odds with the seeming fact that judging a certain proposition is not something you can do voluntarily. I argue that we can resolve this tension by recognising a category of non-voluntary action. An action can be non-voluntary without being involuntary. The notion of non-voluntary action is developed by appeal to the claim that judging has truth as a constitutive goal. This claim, when combined with a conception of judging as a way of settling a question, explains both why judging is genuinely agential, and why it is nevertheless non-voluntary.
Keywords Judgment  Mental action  Epistemic goals  Epistemic normativity
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DOI 10.2307/41487592
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References found in this work BETA
Aristotle (2012). Nicomachean Ethics. Courier Dover Publications.

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Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.

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