David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 173 (3):231 - 257 (2010)
I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.
|Keywords||Epistemology KK principle Self-knowledge|
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Citations of this work BETA
Conor Mchugh (2011). What Do We Aim At When We Believe? Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.
Conor Mchugh (2014). Exercising Doxastic Freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.
David James Barnett (2015). Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief. Noûs 49 (3):n/a-n/a.
Berislav Marušić (2013). The Self-Knowledge Gambit. Synthese 190 (12):1977-1999.
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