Perspectives on Science 9 (3):308-323 (2001)
|Abstract||: In this paper I argue that belief in the greater confirmatory value of prediction over accommodation can best be understood as a function of the practice rather than the logic of science. Attempts to account for this asymmetry within the logic of science have revealed no non-arbitrary way to address the problem of underdetermination as it applies to prediction and thus have failed to account for the preference for prediction over accommodation on logical grounds. Instead, I propose a model that not only justifies and explains this preference, but allows for a richer taxonomy of the types of evidential confirmation that are employed in scientific reasoning|
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