Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505 (2004)
|Abstract||Donald Davidson, and others, have sometimes claimed that the subject matter of social science properly consists only of intentional actions. The author disputes this claim and explores an example drawn from social psychology that shows that some social scientific phenomena cannot be explained unless they are redescribed in nonintentional language. Key Words: intentionality explanation redescription social science Donald Davidson.|
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