A case for extrinsic dispositions

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174 (2003)
Abstract
Many philosophers think that dispositions are necessarily intrinsic. However, there are no good positive arguments for this view. Furthermore, many properties (such as weight, visibility, and vulnerability) are dispositional but are not necessarily shared by perfect duplicates. So, some dispositions are extrinsic. I consider three main objections to the possibility of extrinsic dispositions: the Objection from Relationally Specified Properties, the Objection from Underlying Intrinsic Properties, and the Objection from Natural Properties. These objections ultimately fail.
Keywords dispositions
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    Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.

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