Agent Reliabilism, Subjective Justification, and Epistemic Credit

Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):489-508 (2006)
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Abstract

In this paper I examine John Greco’s agent reliabilism, in particular, his requirement of subjective justification. I argue that his requirement is too weak as it stands to disqualify as knowledge claims some true beliefs arrived at by reliable processes and that it is vulnerable to the “value problem” objection. I develop a more robust account of subjective justification that both avoids the objection that agents require beliefs about their dispositions in order to be subjectively justified and explains why knowledge is more valuable than true belief

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Christine McKinnon
Trent University

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