Divided reference in causal theories of names

Philosophical Studies 30 (4):235 - 242 (1976)
Abstract
Gareth evans has proposed a type of case which shows that kripke's sketch of a causal theory of proper names is in need of modification. Kripke has himself suggested a way in which the modification might proceed, But I argue that this suggestion leads in the wrong direction. I consider a development of kripke's view by michael devitt which may overcome evans' case, But which is shown false by a different sort of case. The latter kind of case also shows that a view of names recently proposed by donnellan is in need of revision
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Michael Mckinsey (2009). Thought by Description. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):83-102.
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