Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123 (2013)
Abstract
In his Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest-relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth-conditions of her ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – a view that I call interests contextualism – is better supported by Stanley's cases than interest-relative invariantism or other versions of epistemic contextualism. My main aim is to show that interests contextualism is a viable, if often over-looked, alternative to the usual positions in the contemporary debate
Keywords Contextualism  Epistemology
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    References found in this work BETA
    Peter Baumann (2011). WAMs: Why Worry? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.

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    Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.
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