David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123 (2013)
In his Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest-relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth-conditions of her ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – a view that I call interests contextualism – is better supported by Stanley's cases than interest-relative invariantism or other versions of epistemic contextualism. My main aim is to show that interests contextualism is a viable, if often over-looked, alternative to the usual positions in the contemporary debate
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References found in this work BETA
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Hannon (2015). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):116-139.
Robin McKenna (2014). Normative Scorekeeping. Synthese 191 (3):607-625.
Michael Hannon (2015). The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
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