David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 42 (4):770-793 (2008)
Harry Frankfurt dramatically shaped the debates over freedom and responsibility by arguing that the sort of freedom germane to responsibility does not involve the freedom to do otherwise. His argument turns upon an example meant to disprove the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Debate over Frankfurt's argument has turned almost exclusively on the success of the example meant to defeat it. But there is more to Frankfurt's argument than the example in question, and this is not widely recognized. Inattention to these other aspects of Frankfurt's argument has distorted the force of it. In this paper I shall explore avenues for both refuting and advancing Frankfurt's argument that look beyond the examples. These further considerations invite us to think in broader terms about moral responsibility's nature and the sort of freedom required for it.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Derk Pereboom (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
R. Jay Wallace (1996). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Harvard University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Ishtiyaque Haji & Michael Mckenna (2011). Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-Style Enabling Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):400-414.
David Palmer (2014). Deterministic Frankfurt Cases. Synthese 191 (16):3847-3864.
Carolina Sartorio (2016). A Partial Defense of the Actual-Sequence Model of Freedom. Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):107-120.
Michael McKenna (2010). Whose Argumentative Burden, Which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.
David Widerker (2009). A Defense of Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):87 – 108.
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