Freedom, fiction and evidential decision theory

Erkenntnis 66 (3):393 - 407 (2007)
Abstract
This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.
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References found in this work BETA
Huw Price (1991). Agency and Probabilistic Causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):157-176.
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Reed Richter (1984). Rationality Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):392 – 403.
Huw Price (1991). Agency and Probabilistic Causality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (2):157-176.
Arif Ahmed (2005). Evidential Decision Theory and Medical Newcomb Problems. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):191-198.
Ellery Eells (1984). Causal Decision Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:177 - 200.
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