How do you know that 'how do you know?' Challenges a speaker's knowledge?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):65-83 (2012)
Abstract
It is often argued that the general propriety of challenging an assertion with ‘How do you know?’ counts as evidence for the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA). Part of the argument is that this challenge seems to directly challenge whether a speaker knows what she asserts. In this article I argue for a re-interpretation of the data, the upshot of which is that we need not interpret ‘How do you know?’ as directly challenging a speaker's knowledge; instead, it's better understood as challenging a speaker's reasons. Consequently, I argue that reasons-based norms can equally well explain this data
Keywords Assertion  Knowledge  Knowledge Norm  Epistemology
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Jonathan Kvanvig (2009). Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rachel McKinnon & John Turri (2013). Irksome Assertions. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.
Similar books and articles
Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
Rachel McKinnon & John Turri (2013). Irksome Assertions. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):123-128.
Jennifer Lackey (2011). Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge. In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 251--276.
John Turri (2011). The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Rachel McKinnon (2013). The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
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