Interests Contextualism

Philosophia 39 (4):741-750 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper I develop a version of contextualism that I call interests contextualism. Interests contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions of knowledge ascribing and denying sentences are partly determined by the ascriber’s interests and purposes. It therefore stands in opposition to the usual view on which the truth-conditions are partly determined by the ascriber’s conversational context. I give an argument against one particular implementation of the usual view, differentiate interests contextualism from other prominent versions of contextualism and argue that, unlike those versions, interests contextualism can mitigate against the epistemic descent objection put forward by Duncan Pritchard in his ‘Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent’ (the objection is that, on the contextualist view, an ascriber of knowledge cannot, for some subject S and proposition p, properly ascribe knowledge that p to S if that ascriber has previously retracted an earlier ascription of knowledge that p to S)
Keywords Contextualism  Epistemology  Scepticism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Robin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
    Similar books and articles
    Robin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
    Peter Baumann (2008). Contextualism and the Factivity Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):580–602.
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