|Abstract||The principal aim of this paper is to defend a certain view about temporary properties from an important objection to that view. More speciﬁcally, I will be defending the view that ostensible temporary intrinsic properties are really relations between the things that have those properties and times. The objection is, roughly speaking, that by construing ostensible temporary intrinsics as relations to times, persisting things are impoverished, being clothed only by their essential (and perhaps also their permanent) intrinsic properties. The worry is that the relations to times view moves us towards thinking of persisting particulars as being quite bare. I do not suggest that this is the only diﬃculty for the relations to times view (in fact, I uncover a potential problem for the view in Section 3), but it is an important one. If the objection is successfully addressed, then a signiﬁcant obstacle to the relations to times view is overcome|
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