Presentism, and speaking of the dead

Philosophical Studies 160 (2):253-263 (2012)
Presentists standardly conform to the eternalist’s paradigm of treating all cases of property-exemplification as involving a single relation of instantiation. This, we argue, results in a much less parsimonious and philosophically explanatory picture than is possible if other alternatives are considered. We argue that by committing to primitive past and future tensed instantiation ties, presentists can make gains in both economy and explanatory power. We show how this metaphysical picture plays out in cases where an individual exists to partake in facts about its past and future, and also in cases where that individual no longer exists, and proxies (or surrogates) for that thing must be found.
Keywords Time  Metaphysics  Presentism  Truthmakers
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9717-2
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References found in this work BETA
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
Alan R. Rhoda (2009). Presentism, Truthmakers, and God. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):41-62.
Mark Johnston (1987). Is There a Problem About Persistence? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:107-135.
Simon Keller (2004). 1. A Problem for Presentism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:83.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram (2015). Nefarious Presentism. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
Lisa Leininger (2015). Presentism and the Myth of Passage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):724-739.
Sam Baron (2013). Tensed Supervenience: A No‐Go for Presentism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):383-401.

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