Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal

Oxford University Press (2006)
Abstract
Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as a regulative ideal.".
Keywords Ethics  Principle (Philosophy
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Call number BJ37.M35 2006
ISBN(s) 0199290652
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Citations of this work BETA
Uri D. Leibowitz (2009). A Defense of a Particularist Research Program. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2):181 - 199.
Jonathan Dancy (2010). Moral Perception. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):99-117.

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