Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37 (2008)
|Abstract||In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.|
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