David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37 (2008)
In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.
|Keywords||Angela Smith Voluntarism Nonvoluntarism Moral responsibility Responsibility for character Control Free will Gary Watson Susan Wolf Real self views|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael McKenna (2012). Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.
John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini (2009). The Truth About Tracing. Noûs 43 (3):531-556.
Sanford C. Goldberg (forthcoming). Should Have Known. Synthese:1-32.
Seth Shabo (2015). More Trouble with Tracing. Erkenntnis 80 (5):987-1011.
Michael McKenna (2016). Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):243-263.
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