Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37 (2008)
In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.
Keywords Angela Smith  Voluntarism  Nonvoluntarism  Moral responsibility  Responsibility for character  Control  Free will  Gary Watson  Susan Wolf  Real self views
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DOI 10.2307/40208889
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Gary Watson (1996). Two Faces of Responsibility. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.

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Citations of this work BETA
David Shoemaker (2015). McKenna’s Quality of Will. Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):695-708.

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