David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369 (2003)
Many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. I challenge this view, hence defending the possibility of bare dispositions. In part 1, I explain more fully what I mean by "disposition," "causal basis," and "bare disposition." In part 2, I consider the claim that the concept of a disposition entails that dispositions are not bare. In part 3, I consider arguments, due to Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, that dispositions necessarily have distinct causal bases. In part 4, I consider arguments by Smith and Stoljar that there can't be bare dispositions because they would make for unwelcome "barely true" counterfactuals. In the end, I find no reason to deny the possibility of bare dispositions.
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Darren Bradley (2013). Functionalism and The Independence Problems. Noûs 47 (1):545-557.
Andrea Guardo (2012). Rule-Following, Ideal Conditions and Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.
Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird (2008). Dispositions, Rules, and Finks. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Dispositions and the Argument From Science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):71 - 90.
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