David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Objections to functional explanations of awareness assert that although functional systems may be adequate to explain behavior, including verbal behavior consisting of assertions of awareness by an individual, they cannot provide for the existence of phenomenal awareness. In this paper, a theory of awareness is proposed that counters this assertion by incorporating two advances: (1) a formal definition of representation, expressed in a functional notation: Newell's Representation Law, and 2) the introduction of real time into the analysis of awareness. This leads to the definition of phenomenal awareness as existing whenever an object contains an autonomously updated configuration satisfying the Representation Law with respect to some aspects of its environment. The relational aspect of the Representation Law permits the development of multiple levels of awareness, which provides for the existence of illusions and hallucinations, and permits the identification of a new measure, accuracy of awareness . The relational perspective also permits the incorporation of referential concepts into the framework. Qualia can then be identified with referentially opaque elements of awareness. The functional form of the Representation Law is linked to neurophysiology and the underlying phenomena of chemistry and physics by phenomena involving activity-dependent connectivity
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ingar Brinck & G. (1999). Representation and Self-Awareness in Intentional Agents. Synthese 118 (1):89-104.
P. Cicogna & M. Bosinelli (2001). Consciousness During Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.
Michael L. Anderson & Donald R. Perlis (2005). The Roots of Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.
Uriah Kriegel (2004). The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 157--180.
Brian Hill (2010). Awareness Dynamics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2):113 - 137.
Yuko Ishihara (2011). Later Nishida on Self-Awareness: Have I Lost Myself Yet? Asian Philosophy 21 (2):193 - 211.
Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller (2006). The Phenomenal Content of Experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.
J. M. Govern & L. A. Marsch (2001). Development and Validation of the Situational Self-Awareness Scale. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (3):366-378.
Michael Huemer (1998). A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness. Dissertation, Rutgers University
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads21 ( #179,907 of 1,907,077 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #129,029 of 1,907,077 )
How can I increase my downloads?