The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135 (2013)
In this paper I present my proposal for the central norm governing the practice of assertion, which I call the Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion (SRNA). The critical features of this norm are that it's highly sensitive to the context of assertion, such that the requirements for warrantedly asserting a proposition shift with changes in context, and that truth is not a necessary condition for warrantedly asserting. In fact, I argue that there are some cases where a speaker may warrantedly assert something she knows to be false. Only SRNA seems able to account for such cases.
|Keywords||Norms of Assertion|
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Matthew A. Benton (2016). Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
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Daniel Greco (2015). Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For. Philosophy Compass 10 (11):754-764.
Clayton Littlejohn (2014). Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1355-1365.
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