The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion

American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135 (2013)
In this paper I present my proposal for the central norm governing the practice of assertion, which I call the Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion (SRNA). The critical features of this norm are that it's highly sensitive to the context of assertion, such that the requirements for warrantedly asserting a proposition shift with changes in context, and that truth is not a necessary condition for warrantedly asserting. In fact, I argue that there are some cases where a speaker may warrantedly assert something she knows to be false. Only SRNA seems able to account for such cases.
Keywords Norms of Assertion
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Matthew A. Benton (2016). Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.

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