David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):45-60 (2003)
The paper considers some differences in the ways that economics and philosophy study equality and egalitarianism in general. First, economics tends to understand a value simply as an ordering over outcomes while philosophy attempts to find a deeper explanation of the ordering in terms of intuitive ideas about the value. Sometimes the supposedly deeper explanation turns out to be insightful, but, in other cases, it is misleading or fails to be explanatory. Second, economists often propose impossibility results intended to show that apparently innocuous ideas about a value can have surprising consequences when they are combined. However, the significance of the results can be difficult to interpret and, sometimes, they do not establish as much as they initially seem to. Third, economists often criticize philosophical work about equality for making misguided assumptions about the possibility of measuring utility or well-being. The paper does not attempt to answer this criticism, but it points out some specific ways in which the scepticism about measurement might be exaggerated.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
S. Scheffler & V. Munoz-Dardé (2005). Equality and Division: Values in Principle. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (79):255-284.
Karsten Klint Jensen (2003). What is the Difference Between (Moderate) Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):89-109.
Larry S. Temkin (2003). Equality, Priority or What? Economics and Philosophy 19 (1):61-87.
Ryan Long (2011). The Incompleteness of Luck Egalitarianism. Social Philosophy Today 27:87-96.
Kenneth Baynes (0040). Democratic Equality and Respect. Theoria 53 (=117;User_Persona=false;ord=1234):1-25.
Daniel M. Hausman & Matt Sensat Waldren (2012). Egalitarianism Reconsidered. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):567-586.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2005). Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
Sagar Sanyal (2012). A Defence of Democratic Egalitarianism. Journal of Philosophy 109 (7):413-34.
P. X. Monaghan (2010). A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms. Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #100,267 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?