David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443 (2010)
Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical burdens of compatibilists and incompatibilists, as well as her assessment of the best arguments for incompatibilism
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References found in this work BETA
Helen Beebee & Alfred R. Mele (2002). Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442):201-223.
Randolph Clarke (2005). On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.
Paul Edwards (1958). Hard and Soft Determinism. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan. 117--25.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
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