David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443 (2010)
Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical burdens of compatibilists and incompatibilists, as well as her assessment of the best arguments for incompatibilism
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References found in this work BETA
Robert H. Kane (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kristin Mickelson (2015). The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What? Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.
Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
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