David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center 83-89 (2000)
Sensory qualities are objective properties; indeed, on the evidence, they are physical properties. However, what makes a physical property the sensory quality it is is its relationship to sensory experiences of perceivers. For instance, the redness of a surface is a physical property of the surface; what makes that physical property surface red is the fact that it disposes surfaces to look red to appropriate visual perceivers in appropriate viewing circumstances. What it is like for something to look red—that is, the actual phenomenal character of visual experiences as of something red—is also a physical property; on the evidence, it is a physical property of the brain
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Will Davies (2014). The Inscrutability of Colour Similarity. Philosophical Studies 171 (2):289-311.
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