David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 15:115-126 (1990)
Alfred Mele has recentIy attempted to direct attention to a neglected species of irrational belief which he calls ‘incontinent belief’. He has devoted a paper and an entire chapter (chapter eight) of his book, Irrationality (Oxford University Press, 1987) to explaining its logical possibility. In what follows, I will appeal to familiar facts about the difference between belief and action to make a case that it is entirely unproblematic that incontinent belief is logically possible. In the process, I will call into question the philosophical intercst of incontinent belief. If what I say is correct, incontinent belief does not warrant the attention of philosophers of mind
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Alfred R. Mele (1991). Incontinent Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
David Hunter (2011). Alienated Belief. Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.
Alfred R. Mele (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1992). Akrasia, Self-Control, and Second-Order Desires. Noûs 26 (3):281-302.
Alfred R. Mele (1986). Incontinent Believing. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222.
Tobias Hoffmann (2006). Aquinas on the Moral Progress of the Weak Willed. In Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller & Matthias Perkams (eds.), The Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Philosophy. Peeters.
António Zilhão (2010). Incontinence, Honouring Sunk Costs and Rationality. In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer. 303--310.
Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
Kevin Lynch (2013). Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief. Erkenntnis 78 (6):1337-1345.
John Cottingham (2009). Why Believe? Continuum.
Derek A. McDougall (1972). Religious Belief and Philosophical Analysis. Mind 81 (324):519-532.
Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels (2010). Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief. Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
Daniel Whiting (2012). Does Belief Aim (Only) at the Truth? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Andrew Chignell, The Ethics of Belief. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Alfred R. Mele (1986). Is Akratic Action Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):673-679.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads14 ( #164,544 of 1,696,590 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #71,321 of 1,696,590 )
How can I increase my downloads?