On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1992)
[Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true
Keywords Causation  Monism  Davidson, D
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Ausonio Marras (1998). Kim's Principle of Explanatory Exclusion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):439-451.
Scott Walden (2001). Kim's Causal Efficacy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):441-460.

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