Perception, causation, and supervenience

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):569-592 (1984)
While a necessary condition for perceiving a physical object is that the object cause the perceiver to undergo a sense experience, this condition is not sufficient. causal theorists attempt to provide a sufficient condition by placing constraints on the way the object causes the perceiver's experience. i argue that this is not possible since the relationship between a perceiver's experience and an object in virtue of which the perceiver perceives the object does not supervene on any of the ways in which the object causes the perceiver's experience
Keywords Causation  Logic  Perception  Semantics  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1984.tb00078.x
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