Graduate studies at Western
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):569-592 (1984)
|Abstract||While a necessary condition for perceiving a physical object is that the object cause the perceiver to undergo a sense experience, this condition is not sufficient. causal theorists attempt to provide a sufficient condition by placing constraints on the way the object causes the perceiver's experience. i argue that this is not possible since the relationship between a perceiver's experience and an object in virtue of which the perceiver perceives the object does not supervene on any of the ways in which the object causes the perceiver's experience|
|Keywords||Causation Logic Perception Semantics Supervenience|
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