Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical

Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135 (1989)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Causality  Dualism  Epiphenomenalism
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DOI 10.2307/2214265
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David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
Stephen Yablo (1992). Cause and Essence. Synthese 93 (3):403 - 449.

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