Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical

Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135 (1989)
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Keywords Causality  Dualism  Epiphenomenalism
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    David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.

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