David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):239-262 (2010)
In Reference and Consciousness, John Campbell attempts to a make a case that what he calls of visual experience, a view that he champions, is superior to what he calls . I argue that his attempt fails. In section 1, I spell out the two views. In section 2, I outline Campbell's case that the Relational View is superior to the Representational View and offer a diagnosis of where Campbell goes wrong. In section 3, I examine the case in detail and argue that it fails. Finally, in section 4, I mention two very well-known problems for the Relational View that are unresolved in the book
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1991). Vision and Intentional Content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.
J. Campbell (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
William Child (1994). Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind. Oxford University Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Adam Pautz (2011). Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World? Philosophical Issues 21 (1):384-433.
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