Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):285-301 (2010)
|Abstract||We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one’s organism. We then criticize animalism—the view that each of us is identical to a human organism—by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus|
|Keywords||Animalism Personal identity Dicephalus Craniopagus parasiticus Cephalopagus Too-many-subjects problem|
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