David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Ethics 12 (1):81 - 104 (2008)
According to liberal egalitarian morality, all human beings are one another's moral equals. Nonhuman animals, by contrast, are not considered to be our moral equals. This essay considers two challenges to the liberal egalitarian view. One is the ``separation problem,'' which is the challenge to identify a morally significant intrinsic difference between all human beings and all nonhuman animals. The other is the “equality problem,” which is to explain how all human beings can be morally equal when there are some human beings whose psychological capacities (and, in some cases, their psychological potentials as well) are no higher than those of certain nonhuman animals. The focus throughout is on the ethics of killing but the arguments are of broader relevance. The essay reaches a skeptical conclusion about our ability to meet these challenges.
|Keywords||animals, cognitive disability equality killing|
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Thomas Douglas (2013). Human Enhancement and Supra-Personal Moral Status. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):473-497.
Jukka Varelius (2009). Minimally Conscious State and Human Dignity. Neuroethics 2 (1):35-50.
Carlos Soto (2013). Killing, Wrongness, and Equality. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):543-559.
Jukka Varelius (2011). Minimally Conscious State, Human Dignity, and the Significance of Species: A Reply to Kaczor. Neuroethics (Browse Results) 6 (1):85-95.
Olli-Pekka Vainio (2013). Objective Morality After Darwin (and Without God)? Heythrop Journal 54 (6):n/a-n/a.
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