Doxastic coercion

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):537-557 (2011)
I examine ways in which belief can and cannot be coerced. Belief simply cannot be coerced in a way analogous to central cases of coerced action, for it cannot be coerced by threats which serve as genuine reasons for belief. But there are two other ways in which the concept of coercion can apply to belief. Belief can be indirectly coerced by threats which serve as reasons for acting in ways designed to bring about a belief, and it can be coercively compelled by threats which non-rationally cause belief. The former is often a necessary and epistemically acceptable feature of compulsory education, but the latter produces beliefs which even if true are epistemically problematic
Keywords coercion  belief  reasons
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.693.x
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Benjamin McMyler (forthcoming). Requesting Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:n/a-n/a.
Benjamin McMyler (2015). Requesting Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Benjamin McMyler (2016). Obedience and Believing a Person. Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):58-77.
Tim Heysse (forthcoming). Power, Norms and Theory. A Meta-Political Inquiry. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-23.
Benjamin McMyler (2015). Requesting Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.

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