Doxastic coercion

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):537-557 (2011)
Abstract
I examine ways in which belief can and cannot be coerced. Belief simply cannot be coerced in a way analogous to central cases of coerced action, for it cannot be coerced by threats which serve as genuine reasons for belief. But there are two other ways in which the concept of coercion can apply to belief. Belief can be indirectly coerced by threats which serve as reasons for acting in ways designed to bring about a belief, and it can be coercively compelled by threats which non-rationally cause belief. The former is often a necessary and epistemically acceptable feature of compulsory education, but the latter produces beliefs which even if true are epistemically problematic
Keywords coercion  belief  reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,005
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Jeremy Wanderer (2013). Testimony and the Interpersonal. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (1):92 - 110.
Similar books and articles
Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
Joan McGregor (1988). PhilipS on Coerced Agreements. Law and Philosophy 7 (2):225 - 236.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-02-03

Total downloads

31 ( #55,910 of 1,101,143 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #34,482 of 1,101,143 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.