Knowing at second hand
Inquiry 50 (5):511 – 540 (2007)
| Abstract | Participants on both sides of the contemporary debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimony commonly describe testimonial knowledge as knowledge acquired at second hand. I argue that fully appreciating the distinctive sense in which testimonial knowledge is secondhand supports anti-reductionism over reductionism but also that it supports a particular kind of anti-reductionism very different from that typically offered in the literature. Testimonial knowledge is secondhand in the demanding sense of being justified by the authority of a speaker where this requires that epistemic responsibility for meeting challenges to the audience's testimonial knowledge is shared between speaker and audience. The epistemic credentials of testimonial knowledge are in this sense importantly interpersonal. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesSanford C. Goldberg (2008). Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1–36.
Tomoji Shogenji (2006). A Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs. Noûs 40 (2):331–346.
Peter J. Graham (2004). Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50.
Arnon Keren (2007). Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge†. Episteme 4 (3):368-381.
Axel Gelfert (2010). Hume on Testimony Revisited. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 13:60-75.
Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Paul Faulkner (1998). Conspiracies And Lyes: Scepticism And The Epistemology of Testimony. Dissertation, University College London
Axel Gelfert (2009). Indefensible Middle Ground for Local Reductionism About Testimony. Ratio 22 (2):170-190.
Benjamin McMyler (2012). Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads37 ( #31,946 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
