The epistemic significance of address

Synthese 190 (6):1059-1078 (2013)
Abstract
The overwhelming consensus amongst epistemologists is that there is no salient epistemological difference between the addressees of a speaker’s testimony and non-addressees. I argue that this overwhelming consensus is mistaken. Addressees of a speaker’s testimony are entitled to pass the epistemic buck or defer justificatory responsibility for their beliefs back to the testimonial speaker, while non-addressees are not. I then develop a provisional account of address that is in a position to mark this epistemic distinction between addressees and non-addressees
Keywords Testimony  Address  Epistemic responsibility  Deference  Buck passing
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    References found in this work BETA
    Robert Brandom (1983). Asserting. Noûs 17 (4):637-650.
    Elizabeth Fricker (2006). Second-Hand Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Philip J. Nickel (2012). Trust and Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):301-316.
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