David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Bioethics 9 (2):91–126 (1995)
The dominant conception of brain death as the death of the whole brain constitutes an unstable compromise between the view that a person ceases to exist when she irreversibly loses the capacity for consciousness and the view that a human organism dies only when it ceases to function in an integrated way. I argue that no single criterion of death captures the importance we attribute both to the loss of the capacity for consciousness and to the loss of functioning of the organism as a whole. This is because the person or self is one thing and the human organism is another. We require a separate account of death for each. Only if we systematically distinguish between persons and human organisms will we be able to provide plausible accounts both of the conditions of our ceasing to exist and of when it is that we begin to exist. This paper, in short, argues for a form of mind-body dualism and draws out some of its implications for various practical moral problems.
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Mark Johnston (1987). Human Beings. Journal of Philosophy 84 (February):59-83.
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Stephen Buckle (1988). Arguing From Potential. Bioethics 2 (3):227–253.
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Citations of this work BETA
Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein (2007). Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating? American Journal of Bioethics 7 (1):37-48.
J. L. Bernat (2010). How the Distinction Between "Irreversible" and "Permanent" Illuminates Circulatory-Respiratory Death Determination. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (3):242-255.
James L. Bernat (2006). The Whole-Brain Concept of Death Remains Optimum Public Policy. Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 34 (1):35-43.
Jeff Mcmahan (1996). Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1):3–35.
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