David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 63 (4):328–331 (2003)
Scanlon suggests a buck-passing account of goodness. To say that something is good is not to give a reason to, say, favour it; rather it is to say that there are such reasons. When it comes to wrongness, however, Scanlon rejects a buck-passing account: to say that j ing is wrong is, on his view, to give a sufficient moral reason not to j. Philip Stratton-Lake 2003 argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his (Scanlon’s) view of wrongness by adopting a buck-passing account of wrongness. We argue that this manoeuvre does not succeed. Scanlon’s notion of wrongness rests on the idea of a reasonably rejectable principle. As Stratton-Lake points out, Scanlon offers two accounts, one in terms of permission, the other in terms of proscription. The permission account is tricky to formulate. Scanlon’s account (quoted in Stratton-Lake 2003: 71) might suggest any of the following four formulations (where the principles in question are principles ‘governing how one may act’ (Scanlon..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Philip Stratton–Lake (2003). Scanlon's Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection. Analysis 63 (277):70–76.
Citations of this work BETA
Tamra Frei (2009). The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist. Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (1):47-65.
Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Contractualist Replies to the Redundancy Objections. Theoria 71 (1):38-58.
Similar books and articles
Jussi Suikkanen (2005). Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):513 - 535.
Pekka Väyrynen (2006). Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press 295-324.
Jussi Suikkanen (2009). Buck-Passing Accounts of Value. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.
Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
Philip Stratton-Lake & Brad Hooker (2006). Scanlon Versus Moore on Goodness. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press 149.
Philip Cook (2008). An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck. Utilitas 20 (4):490-507.
S. Matthew Liao (2010). The Buck-Passing Account of Value: Lessons From Crisp. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):421 - 432.
Roger Crisp (2009). Goodness and Reasons: A Response to Stratton-Lake. Mind 118 (472):1095-1099.
Philip Stratton-Lake (2003). Scanlon, Permissions, and Redundancy: Response to McNaughton and Rawling. Analysis 63 (4):332–337.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads100 ( #25,666 of 1,725,806 )
Recent downloads (6 months)52 ( #22,138 of 1,725,806 )
How can I increase my downloads?