Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||Which actions does morality require of us? What does it forbid and what does it permit? In trying to fi nd some general answers to these questions, moral theorists typically start from commonsense morality, from what ordinary people think about moral issues. In deciding how to act, people often think about the consequences of their actions: they try to fi nd the action that leads to the best overall outcome. One moral theory, act-consequentialism, claims that this is the only consideration that is relevant to moral choice. The right action – the one we are required to do – is the one that produces the most good; it is wrong to do less good than we could. Act-consequentialism seems, however, to confl ict with commonsense morality. Although we should be concerned to make things go as well as possible for everyone, most people do not think that this exhausts morality, or even identifi es some of its most crucial elements. Are we not, for instance, sometimes required to aid our loved ones, even if we do not thereby produce the best overall? And are there no limits on what we may do to produce good, or limits on what we must do to produce it? Deontology contrasts with consequentialism in its answers to these questions, and is, in one of its versions, the theory we favour|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Alex Rajczi (2011). The Argument From Self-Creation: A Refutation of Act-Consequentialism and a Defense of Moral Options. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):315.
Alex Rajczi (2007). Integrity and Ordinary Morality. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):15-27.
Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (June 30, 2008). In James Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers.
Tim Mulgan (2006). SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM. Ratio 6 (2):121 - 134.
David McNaughton & Piers Rawling (1998). On Defending Deontology. Ratio 11 (1):37–54.
Peter Vallentyne (2006). Against Maximizing Act-Consequentialism (December 2, 2010) in Moral Theories Edited by Jamie Dreier (Blackwell Publishers, 2006), Pp. 21-37. [REVIEW] In Dreier Jamie (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theories. Blackwell Publishers.
Douglas W. Portmore (2005). Combining Teleological Ethics with Evaluator Relativism: A Promising Result. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):95–113.
Philip Nickel (2001). Moral Testimony and its Authority. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
Samuel Scheffler (1994). The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Oxford University Press.
Tyler Cowen (2006). The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (04):383-.
Added to index2010-09-25
Total downloads69 ( #15,407 of 722,947 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,947 )
How can I increase my downloads?