Doing well enough: Toward a logic for common-sense morality

Studia Logica 57 (1):167 - 192 (1996)
On the traditional deontic framework, what is required (what morality demands) and what is optimal (what morality recommends) can't be distinguished and hence they can't both be represented. Although the morally optional can be represented, the supererogatory (exceeding morality's demands), one of its proper subclasses, cannot be. The morally indifferent, another proper subclass of the optional-one obviously disjoint from the supererogatory-is also not representable. Ditto for the permissibly suboptimal and the morally significant. Finally, the minimum that morality allows finds no place in the traditional scheme. With a focus on the question, What would constitute a hospitable logical neighborhood for the concept of supererogation?, I present and motivate an enriched logical and semantic framework for representing all these concepts of common sense morality.
Keywords deontic logic  supererogation  ordering semantics  indifference  optimality  DWE
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DOI 10.1007/BF00370674
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References found in this work BETA
J. O. Urmson (1958). Saints and Heroes. In A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of Washington Press

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Matthew Chrisman (2012). 'Ought' and Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.

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