David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studia Logica 57 (1):167 - 192 (1996)
On the traditional deontic framework, what is required (what morality demands) and what is optimal (what morality recommends) can't be distinguished and hence they can't both be represented. Although the morally optional can be represented, the supererogatory (exceeding morality's demands), one of its proper subclasses, cannot be. The morally indifferent, another proper subclass of the optional-one obviously disjoint from the supererogatory-is also not representable. Ditto for the permissibly suboptimal and the morally significant. Finally, the minimum that morality allows finds no place in the traditional scheme. With a focus on the question, What would constitute a hospitable logical neighborhood for the concept of supererogation?, I present and motivate an enriched logical and semantic framework for representing all these concepts of common sense morality.
|Keywords||deontic logic supererogation ordering semantics indifference optimality DWE|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael A. Slote (1985). Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism. Routledge & Kegan.
J. O. Urmson (1958). Saints and Heroes. In A. I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of Washington Press
Paul McNamara (1996). Must I Do What I Ought (or Will the Least I Can Do Do)? In Mark Brown & Jose' Carmo (eds.), Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag 154-173.
Gregory Mellema (1991). Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence. State University of New York Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Chrisman (2012). 'Ought' and Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
Alessio Moretti (2009). The Geometry of Standard Deontic Logic. Logica Universalis 3 (1):19-57.
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