Religious Studies 38 (3):265-281 (2002)
|Abstract||Swinburne offers a greater-goods defence to the problem of evil within a deontological framework. Yet deontologists characteristically hold that we have no right to inflict great evil on any individual to bring about the greater good. Swinburne accepts that humans generally do not have that right, but argues that God, as the supreme care-giver, does. I contend that Swinburne's argument that care-givers have such a right is flawed, and defend the classical deontological objection to imposing evils that good may come.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Richard Swinburne (1988). Does Theism Need a Theodicy? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):287 - 311.
Quentin Smith (1998). Swinburne's Explanation of the Universe. Religious Studies 34 (1):91-102.
John Lamont (1996). Stump and Swinburne on Revelation. Religious Studies 32 (3):395 - 411.
Richard Swinburne (2004). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Richard Swinburne (1978). Natural Evil. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):295 - 301.
Charles E. Gutenson (1997). What Swinburne Should Have Concluded. Religious Studies 33 (3):243-247.
Jeremy Gwiazda (2010). Richard Swinburne, the Existence of God, and Exact Numerical Values. Philosophia 38 (2):357-363.
Richard Swinburne (2003). Freedom and Evil. In Julian Baggini & Jeremy Stangroom (eds.), What Philosophers Think. Continuum Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #67,448 of 548,969 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,969 )
How can I increase my downloads?