Is God (almost) a consequentialist? Swinburne's moral theory

Religious Studies 38 (3):265-281 (2002)
Swinburne offers a greater-goods defence to the problem of evil within a deontological framework. Yet deontologists characteristically hold that we have no right to inflict great evil on any individual to bring about the greater good. Swinburne accepts that humans generally do not have that right, but argues that God, as the supreme care-giver, does. I contend that Swinburne's argument that care-givers have such a right is flawed, and defend the classical deontological objection to imposing evils that good may come.
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DOI 10.1017/S003441250200608X
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