David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240 (2011)
Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon’s view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards.
|Keywords||Metaethics Metanormative quietism Metanormative realism Normativity Reasons Scanlon|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Tristram McPherson (2015). What is at Stake in Debates Among Normative Realists? Noûs 49 (1):123-146.
Ramon Das (2016). Evolutionary Debunking of Morality: Epistemological or Metaphysical? Philosophical Studies 173 (2):417-435.
David Plunkett (2015). Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy. Inquiry 58 (7-8):828-874.
Billy Dunaway (2015). Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.
Kevin Toh (2013). Jurisprudential Theories and First‐Order Legal Judgments. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):457-471.
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