David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240 (2011)
Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view metaphysically quietist normative realism . This paper argues that while this view can appear to constitute an attractive alternative to more traditional forms of normative realism, it cannot deliver on this promise. I examine Scanlon’s attempt to defend such a quietist realism, and argue that rather than silencing metaphysical questions about normative reasons, his defense at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon’s view, and argue on general grounds that that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards.
|Keywords||Metaethics Metanormative quietism Metanormative realism Normativity Reasons Scanlon|
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Richard Boyd (1988). How to Be a Moral Realist. In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. 181-228.
David Copp (2001). Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):1-43.
James Dreier (2002). Metaethics and Normative Commitment. Philosophical Issues 12 (s1):241-263.
James Dreier (2004). Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
Citations of this work BETA
Maksymilian Del Mar (2010). Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism. Human Studies 33 (2):305-323.
Kevin Toh (2013). Jurisprudential Theories and First‐Order Legal Judgments. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):457-471.
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