David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):627-654 (2012)
In this essay I discuss the limits of recent attempts to develop a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic on the basis of a commitment to ‘ethical naturalism.’ By ‘ethical naturalism’ I mean the view that ethics can be founded on claims about what it is for human beings to flourish qua member of the human species, which is analogous to what it is for plants and other animals to flourish qua member of their particular species. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s account of ‘strong evaluation,’ I argue that there are important features of our ethical life that can only be properly understood from a first-personal or phenomenological standpoint as contrasted with the third-personal standpoint of ethical naturalism: viz., (1) The sense of ‘nobility’ in performing virtuous actions for their own sake as a constitutive part of the good life; (2) The nature and extent of other-regarding concern; and (3) The issue of ‘the meaning of life,’ which also raises the issue of the place of ‘transcendence’ in an account of the good life. While I emphasize the need for a deeper engagement with our first-personal evaluative experience, I also discuss the interdependence of the first-personal and third-personal perspectives in the ethical life.
|Keywords||virtue ethics ethical naturalism neo-Aristotelian|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Simon Hope (2013). Neo-Aristotelian Social Justice: An Unanswered Question. Res Publica 19 (2):157-172.
John Hacker-Wright (2009). Human Nature, Personhood, and Ethical Naturalism. Philosophy 84 (3):413-427.
David Copp (2003). Why Naturalism? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.) (2012). Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press.
Marjorie J. Cooper (2007). Are We Sending Mixed Messages? How Philosophical Naturalism Erodes Ethical Instruction. Journal of Business Ethics 75 (2):171 - 180.
John Hacker-Wright (2009). What is Natural About Foot's Ethical Naturalism? Ratio 22 (3):308-321.
Craig Paterson (2006). Aquinas, Finnis and Non-Naturalism. In Craig Paterson & Matthew Pugh (eds.), Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue. Ashgate
Robin W. Lovin & Frank E. Reynolds (1992). Ethical Naturalism and Indigenous Cultures: Introduction. Journal of Religious Ethics 20 (2):267 - 278.
Candace Vogler (2006). Modern Moral Philosophy Again: Isolating the Promulgation Problem. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):345–362.
Craig Paterson (2003). A Life Not Worth Living? Studies in Christian Ethics 16 (2):1-20.
Philip J. Ivanhoe (2009). Pluralism, Toleration, and Ethical Promiscuity. Journal of Religious Ethics 37 (2):311-329.
Christopher Toner (2008). Sorts of Naturalism: Requirements for a Successful Theory. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):220–250.
Micah Lott (2012). Have Elephant Seals Refuted Aristotle? Nature, Function, and Moral Goodness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (3):353-375.
Added to index2012-12-02
Total downloads30 ( #126,033 of 1,789,933 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #264,810 of 1,789,933 )
How can I increase my downloads?